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Abstract
This paper examines how anti-corruption educational campaigns affect the attitudes
of Russian university students towards corruption and academic integrity. About
2,000 survey participants were randomly assigned to one of four different information
materials (brochures or videos) about the negative consequences of corruption or to
a control group. Using machine learning to detect effect heterogeneity, we find that
various groups of students react to the same information differently. Those who
commonly plagiarize, who receive excellent grades, and whose fathers are highly
educated develop stronger negative attitudes towards corruption in the aftermath
of our intervention. However, some information materials lead to more tolerant
views on corruption among those who rarely plagiarize, who receive average or
above average grades, and whose fathers are less educated. Therefore, policy makers
aiming to implement anti-corruption education at a larger scale should scrutinize
the possibility of (undesired) heterogeneous effects across student groups.
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1 Introduction
Young people - and particularly students - are frequently observed to be the driving forces
pushing for reforms that promote justice and fight corruption. The Rose Revolution
in Georgia (2003), the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005), the Arab Spring in
Egypt (2011) and the student movements in Taiwan (2014), as well as the protests
against corruption in Bulgaria (2013), Ukraine (2014), and Romania (2017), are just
a few recent examples of student activism that resulted in social change (Altbach, 2016;
Denisova-Schmidt et al., 2015; Klemencˇicˇ, 2014). In Russia, where the Putin generation
is often viewed as infantile and apolitical (Kasamara and Sorokina, 2017; Volkov, 2017),
the recently increased participation of youth in anti-corruption rallies is particularly
interesting and controversial.
Corruption1 has received substantial attention in Russia over the last decade, not
only because of its detrimental effects on the national economy and society in general,
but also because it became increasingly politicized. The Russian opposition movement
has built an agenda around it, attracting a growing number of supporters, among them
many high school and university students. Public anti-corruption rallies in March 2017
were even described as “angry pupils walks” in the media (Korostelev et al., 2017). On
the other hand, opinion polls suggest that active participants in anti-corruption rallies
are not representative of Russian youth. Less than 8% of people ages 18 – 24 have an
interest in political issues and discuss them with friends or relatives, while only about
10% are ready to protest (Volkov, 2017). Overall, the stance of the Russian youth towards
corruption issues is not clear, as no comprehensive study has yet scrutinized this problem
on a grand scale.
This paper (a.) investigates the views of public university students in the Russian
region of Khabarovsk on corruption and academic dishonesty during their studies and
(b.) examines the effects of an educational campaign exposing students to various
informational materials about corruption and its negative consequences. To this end,
we surveyed a large sample of about 2,000 students and examined four different
anti-corruption materials, namely, two videos produced by Transparency International
Russia about the negative consequences of bribery and reiderstvo (a hostile corporate
takeover) and two brochures, one a general anti-corruption brochure developed by the
local authorities and the other a brochure addressing local corruption cases developed for
students by the authors.
1Corruption can be defined as both “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency
International) and “the lack of academic integrity”; see recent discussions with examples in
Denisova-Schmidt, 2017a, 2017b; Denisova-Schmidt and de Wit, 2017.
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The results of our study suggest that, while various forms of dishonesty are prevalent
among the surveyed students, corruption itself is predominantly viewed as something
bad – “crime” and “evil” are the strongest associations expressed in the survey. The
perception of corruption at the national level is more negative than at the individual level,
which points to the possibility that some respondents have adapted to the situation and
might use it for their own benefit. Interest in a roundtable discussion about corruption
– a proxy for inclination towards anti-corruption activities – is strikingly low: only
5% of students agreed to join this event. This is suggestive for young participants in
anti-corruption rallies not being representative for the majority of Russian students, which
would also be in line with national statistics (Volkov, 2017) showing low political activism
among the youth.
Concerning the effectiveness of the interventions, we find that although the effects of
information exposure are not very pronounced in the total sample, there exist systematic
patterns across subsamples defined by certain student characteristics. One interesting
result is that, while our intervention promotes awareness of the negative consequences
of corruption among students who plagiarize, it leads to more tolerance of academic
dishonesty and more pragmatic attitudes towards corruption among “non-plagiarists”.
When the total sample is split based on students’ academic performance, we find that
excellent academic performers are overall more responsive to the interventions, fostering
negative perceptions of corruption in this subgroup. Unexpectedly, among students with
lower academic performance, the video treatment about a hostile corporate raid led
to more positive opinions on how corruption impacts the Russian economy, education
system, and police, perhaps due to a misinterpretation of the message of the video.
Furthermore, only students whose fathers are highly educated appear to respond to
the interventions in the desired way: the intervention generated negative views of the
consequences of corruption. On the contrary, students with less educated fathers assessed
the consequences of corruption more positively after being exposed to the interventions.
Finally, looking at gender differences, we find female students to have stronger negative
views on corruption,2 but to be generally less responsive to interventions and more
reluctant to participate in anti-corruption activities than males.
The fact that the interventions affect various participant groups differently has policy
implications, as the same information might promote desired attitudes and behaviour
among some individuals while yielding unwanted results among others. Therefore, policy
makers aiming to conduct large-scale anti-corruption campaigns should scrutinize the
possibility of effect heterogeneity and target subgroups accordingly. In particular, our
2A large body of empirical literature suggests that women tend to be less corrupt; see Dimant and
Tosato, 2017; Dollar et al., 2001; Frank et al., 2011; Rivas, 2013; Swamy et al., 2001.
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study suggests that anti-corruption information campaigns should be focused primarily
on individuals who are more likely to be involved in wrongdoing, but not those who are
distant from corrupt activities.
Our paper is related to a growing number of corruption studies using lab or field
experiments for causal inference (see, for example, discussions in Armantier and Boly,
2011, 2013; Barr and Serra, 2010; Findley et al., 2014; Holmes, 2015; Serra and
Wantchekon, 2012). One study that is particularly interesting in our context is that
of John et al. (2014), whose findings in an experiment involving US students suggest
that awareness about widespread dishonesty increases personal cheating activities while
monetary incentives are rather unimportant. Also, Corbacho et al. (2016) find for an
information experiment in Costa Rica that individuals who believe that everyone around
them is corrupt and/or who have personal experience with corruption are more prone
to corruption. Finally, our paper is related to Denisova-Schmidt et al. (2015) and
Denisova-Schmidt et al. (2016), which investigate the effectiveness of an anti-corruption
folder developed by Transparency International among students in Lviv, Ukraine and
Khabarovsk, Russia, respectively. We improve upon these previous studies by considering
more and different interventions (both brochures and videos), using a larger sample, and
more thoroughly investigating effect heterogeneity. For instance, the previous studies
did not present differences in the effects across levels of parental education. However,
similar to our comparison of “plagiarist” and “non-plagiarists”, Denisova-Schmidt et al.
(2015) separately consider students with and without experience in corrupt activities
and also find that the intervention might increase tolerance for corrupt behaviour. As
a methodological advancement compared to other empirical studies in the field, we use
machine learning approaches by Belloni et al. (2014) and Athey and Imbens (2016) for
conducting robustness checks and finding interesting effect heterogeneities, respectively.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the research
design and presents the data along with descriptive statistics. Section 3 discusses the
estimation methods applied in the study. The results are reported in Section 4. Section
5 concludes.
2 Research design and data
Our study is based on a large-scale randomized information campaign conducted among
university students in the two cities of the Khabarovsk region – Khabarovsk and
Komsomolsk-on-Amur. With populations of about 611,000 and 251,000 people (as of
January 1, 2016; Federal State Statistics Service, 2016), respectively, both cities are
among the largest urban centres in the Russian Far East. There are twelve universities
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in Khabarovsk and two in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, with a total of around 68,700 students
in the Khabarovsk region in 2015 (Obrazovanie v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2014).
The sample of students was drawn from four large public universities in Khabarovsk
and two in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, whose total student population accounted for over
70% of all students in the region in 2016 (according to our own calculations based on the
online enrolment data from the participating universities). The survey was conducted in
November and early December 2016 by a group of students previously instructed by our
research team. The following research design was utilized: the interviewers approached
students on campuses asking questions about their major, year and education scheme
(full- or part-time, on-site or distance education). Only full-time, on-site students with
majors in social, technical, and natural sciences or humanities were selected for the
study. First-semester bachelor and diploma students were excluded, as they could lack
sufficient experience and knowledge about university life. Students in other disciplines,
e.g. medicine or theology, were not selected because of their small program sizes. Eligible
individuals were asked to take part in a survey about attitudes towards corruption. The
questionnaire included a range of questions about the students’ motivation to join the
university, their academic performance, previous experiences with informal practices3,
family background, and several demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. All the
interviews were conducted face-to-face and the interviewers filled out the questionnaire
forms in Russian, the native language of all the persons involved.4
At one point during the interview, before being asked about their attitudes towards
corruption and informal practices, every participant was randomized into one of the
four interventions, henceforth also referred to as treatments, or a control group. Each
treatment included exposure to one type of information materials about corruption and
its negative consequences. The interviewer asked students to play a little game, with
the subsequent question depending on the outcome of rolling a fair six-sided (cubical)
die. The following assignment rule was applied: if 1 was rolled, the student received an
official corruption-awareness brochure (henceforth called the “official brochure”). Rolling
a 2 entailed a brochure prepared by our research team on the basis of the materials by
Transparency International, a global anti-corruption NGO, and tailored to the student
audience (henceforth called the “tailored brochure”). For a 3 or 4, a short video by
Transparency International Russia about the negative consequences of bribery or about
hostile corporate takeovers (“reiderstvo”), respectively, was shown. 5 and 6 entailed
3Here, “informal practices” refers to the practical norms that people often use in order to get things
done.
4Two sensitive questions about the informal practices exercised by the students in their studies and
whether they had encountered bribery at the university were asked on a separate card and filled out by
the interviewees themselves.
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assignment to the control (or non-treated) group. The brochures were professionally
printed and the video materials were shown on tablets brought along by the interviewers.
The official brochure was, in our opinion, overwhelming for readers, as it contained
too much detailed information, as well as long, redundant definitions, and it was
pedantically written and typed in a very small font. It included a portrait of the Russian
president Vladimir Putin and his quotation about the fight against corruption, long
definitions of corruption and anti-corruption activities, a list of laws and directives against
corruption, some corruption-related statistics, examples of anti-corruption measures in
the Khabarovsk region, an enumeration of punishments for corruption-related crimes,
and a long list of contact information for various responsible authorities (see Appendix
B for the brochure translations).
The tailored brochure was created by our research team with students in mind. We
provided succinct and practical information, knowing the experiment participants would
not have enough time to absorb less important details. Simple, everyday language was
preferred over complex official formulations. The tailored brochure contained a short
definition of corruption, a graph describing different types of corruption, some statistics,
the negative consequences of bribery (a common corruption type), examples of recent
corruption crimes in the Khabarovsk region, and a call for action.
The videos about the negative consequences of bribery and hostile corporate raiding
were part of the “Ten Faces of Corruption” cartoon series developed by Transparency
International Russia within the educational project “The Alphabet of a Corruption
Fighter”. The project targeted high-school and university students and attempted to
clarify basic corruption-related concepts. The cartoons only offered video content without
audio commentary. The characters were rats depicting the essence of various corrupt
behaviours. The video about bribery (Transparency International Russia, 2015a) featured
a suicide bomber rat giving a bribe to a security officer when boarding an airplane.
The bomb then exploded in the air destroying the plane. The video about reiderstvo
(Transparency International Russia, 2015b) showed rat police kicking out and arresting
the director of a well-functioning cheese factory and overtaking his position.5
After the individuals assigned to the treatment groups had familiarized themselves
with the respective information materials, the interviewers continued with questions
about the informal practices used by students, their moral assessment of corruption, and
whether corruption could be eradicated in Russia. At the end of the interview, students
were invited to participate in a roundtable discussion taking place on International
5Reiderstvo, or asset-grabbing, is the illicit acquisition of a business or part of a business in Russia;
for more, see, for example, Louise Shelley and Judy Deane, http://reiderstvo.org/.
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Anti-Corruption Day6 (December 9, 2016) at the Pacific National University in
Khabarovsk. Finally, respondents were asked whether they would take part in a similar
survey next year. Interested students could leave their contact information. All of the
post-intervention questions described above were used to construct outcome variables.
Despite the aim to randomize treatment assignment by rolling a die, the distribution of
numbers 1 to 6 in the total sample is not perfectly uniform (as would be expected in case
of proper randomization), as illustrated in Figure 1. In fact, Pearson’s chi-squared test
clearly rejects the uniform distribution at the 5% level of statistical significance.7 The
probabilities of the brochure treatments (treatments 1 and 2 in Figure 1) were higher
compared to the video treatments (3 and 4) and the control group (5 and 6).
Figure 1: Treatment distribution in the total sample
Despite such imbalances in treatment assignment, the average values of the covariates
measured in the survey prior to treatment are balanced across the treatment states
similarly to a successfully randomized experiment. F -tests conducted for each of the
87 observed covariates revealed hardly any statistically significant (at the 5% level)
differences across treatment groups; see Table A1 in Appendix A. One exception was the
indicator for having a family with both parents with a p-value of 0.04. For four further
covariates – namely, the indicators for a family with no parents, father’s occupation:
househusband or a retiree, having a Unified State Exam (USE) score of more than 250
6The General Assembly of the United Nations introduced Anti-Corruption Day in 2005 in order “to
raise awareness of corruption and of the role of the Convention [against Corruption, resolution 58/4]
in combating and preventing it” http://www.un.org/en/events/anticorruptionday/background.
shtml.
7The test statistic and the critical value are equal to 21.08 and 9.24, respectively.
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(highest quantile), and having a job related to students’ education – differences were
statistically significant at the 10% level. Given the large number of covariates tested,
we are not concerned by these few rejections. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we
ran the main estimations presented in Section 4 on the subsample of students surveyed
by the interviewers for whom proper treatment randomization (i.e. uniformly distributed
numbers 1 to 6) could not be rejected at the 10% level when conducting F -tests separately
for each interviewer. Neither covariate balance nor treatment effect estimates in this
subsample differed to an important extent from our main results based on the full sample.
Our final sample is comprised of 2,003 individuals, 75% (1,501) of whom study in
Khabarovsk and 25% (502) in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Table 1 shows the means and the
standard deviations for selected covariates8 for the 1,741 respondents without any missing
values in these variables. The typical respondent is about 20 years old and just over half
of the sample (54%) is female. About one third of the individuals reported to spend
on average less than 10,000 rubles ($155)9 a month, while 55% of the respondents have
average monthly expenditures between 10,000 and 20,000 rubles ($155-310), and 12%
spend more than 20,000 rubles. The university education of slightly more than half of
the students is state-financed. About 37% of the survey participants study humanities,
31% major in social sciences, 25% are in technical sciences, and 8% specialize in natural
sciences.
Concerning previous experiences with wrongdoing and corruption, the self-assessed
use of connections is more common than bribery for solving problems. Yet the incidence
of additional payments in school prior to tertiary education (e.g. fees for construction,
maintenance and school repairs, guarding, etc.) is non-negligible and higher than
gift-giving to teachers.10 Strikingly, about 34% of the participants claimed to have
encountered forms of wrongdoing (e.g. bribes, gifts, and help from on-site proctors) during
the USE, while 21% encountered some wrongdoing in the university admission process
(e.g. cases of admission commissions, instances of preferential admissions). Reportedly,
the incidence of bribery at universities after admission appears to be less of an issue.
Concerning the use of informal practices by respondents while studying, by far the most
8The full list of covariates can be found in Table A1 in Appendix A.
9Based on the average of daily exchange rates from the Russian Central Bank in the period January
1 to November 1, 2016.
10Primary and secondary education is predominantly public and tuition-free in Russia. However,
informal payments at schools are widespread and range from covering basic maintenance of a school
building and the provision of school guarding to some excessive school needs. While voluntary additional
school payments have been ruled legal, the fees are often coercive in reality. Also, gift-giving to teachers
can be voluntary or forced by parental committees or even the teachers themselves. Our data do not
allow the distinguishing between the two types in both the cases of additional school fees and gift-giving
to teachers.
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popular practice is partial plagiarism when writing papers, followed by crib sheets and
copying from others at exams. The least common form of academic dishonesty is asking
professors for preferential treatment (e.g. easing requirements, exemption from exams,
etc.).
Table 1: Summary statistics for selected covariates
Variables Mean SD
Age 19.99 1.23
Gender: female (binary) 0.54 0.50
Monthly spending: <10k rub (binary) 0.33 0.47
Monthly spending: 10–20k rub (binary) 0.55 0.50
Monthly spending: >20k rub (binary) 0.12 0.33
Education is state financed (binary) 0.53 0.50
Major: humanities (binary) 0.37 0.48
Major: social sciences (binary) 0.31 0.46
Major: technical sciences (binary) 0.25 0.43
Major: natural sciences (binary) 0.08 0.27
Average grade (1=satisfactory...5=excellent) 3.26 1.12
Family or friends solved problems using connections (1=never...5=system.) 2.34 1.04
Family or friends solved problems using bribes (1=never...5=system.) 1.92 0.98
Frequency of giving gifts to teachers at school (1=never...5=system.) 2.80 1.08
Frequency of paying additional fees at school (1=never...5=system.) 3.22 1.20
Encountered (personally/friends/relatives) wrongdoing at USE (binary) 0.34 0.47
Encountered (personally/friends/relatives) wrongdoing at univ.admission (binary) 0.21 0.41
Encountered bribery at university (1=never...5=system.) 1.55 0.86
How often do you use the following practices? (1=never...5=system.)
Use crib sheets at exams 2.90 1.17
Submit papers downloaded from the internet 2.25 1.26
Buy papers from friends or specialized firms 1.85 1.15
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet 3.27 1.20
Copy from other students during exams or tests 2.85 1.17
Deceive professors about study problems 1.95 1.09
Ask professors for preferential treatment 1.63 0.95
Item non-response is low in our data. In about 4% of the observations, the students’
year of birth is missing. Non-response in other demographic, socioeconomic, or individual
characteristics is even rarer. About 3% of the students were reluctant to reveal their
own informal practices (concerning the question “How often do you use the following
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practices. . . ?”) and whether they encountered bribery at the university. In the estimation
part of our analysis, observations with missing values in the covariates are kept in the data.
Missing values in covariates are replaced with zeros while dummy variables indicating
missing observations are generated.
3 Methods
Two econometric methods are employed to evaluate the effects of the anti-corruption
information materials on the outcomes of interest. Our first strategy is to take differences
in mean outcome values between each of the treatment groups and the control group. This
yields unbiased estimates of the causal treatment effects if randomization was successful,
meaning that any observed and unobserved pre-treatment characteristics are comparable
across the treatment groups.
Although the observed pre-treatment characteristics are well balanced in the sample,
a few minor differences are still present. As a robustness check (the results of which are
presented in Appendix A), our second strategy aims at controlling for such differences.
Specifically, our goal is to control for the confounders of both treatment assignment and
outcome of interest in a flexible functional way, potentially allowing interactions as well
as higher order terms of confounders to enter both the treatment and outcome equations.
To this end, we apply the method of Belloni et al. (2014) to select confounders as well
as non-linear functions thereof based on LASSO regression, a machine learning approach
permitting variable selection in high dimensional data. More concisely, this so-called
post-double-selection method relies on a two-step, LASSO-based variable selection of
control variables that are either predictive for the treatment or the outcome (or both).
Thereafter, the treatment effects of interest are estimated by an OLS regression of the
outcome on the treatment indicators and the selected controls. In our study, we generated
higher order terms up to the third order and interaction terms up to the second order for
all covariates using the “Generate.Powers” command in the “LARF” package by An and
Wan (2016) for the statistical software “R”. We added these terms to the list of potential
controls for the two-step LASSO procedure and estimated the treatment effects using the
“rlassoEffects” command with its default options in the R package “hdm” by Spindler
et al. (2016).
Our investigation goes beyond the analysis of treatment effects in the total population
and explores the effect heterogeneity of the intervention across various subgroups. As
for control variable selection, we opted for a data-driven rather than ad-hoc approach
for finding the most substantial effect heterogeneities in an “honest” way, preventing
inferential multiple testing issues related to “snooping” for subgroups with significant
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effects. To this end, we employ the causal tree approach by Athey and Imbens (2016)
to partition data recursively into subpopulations that react differently to the treatment.
This technique builds on regression trees, yet another machine learning approach, but
with some modifications to allow for causal inference on treatment effects and finding
the largest effect heterogeneities across subgroups, rather than mere outcome prediction.
Specifically, the method “honestly” uses only part of the sample for subgroup definition
(or partitioning) and the other part of the sample to estimate treatment effects within
the defined subgroups, which prevents the aforementioned inference problems. We use
the “causalTree” package by Athey et al. (2016) to apply causal tree estimation with
cross-validation11 in order to detect those important effect heterogeneities that occur
across a range of different outcomes. We note that, as the method only allows for single
rather than multiple treatments, we define a binary treatment indicator that is one in
case of one of the four interventions (die numbers 1 to 4) and zero otherwise (numbers 5
and 6) when searching for effect heterogeneities.
4 Results
4.1 Effect estimates in the total sample
Table 2 reports the estimation results based on the mean differences in the total sample.
Column 2 presents the mean outcomes in the control group. The third column contains
the estimated treatment effects of the official corruption-awareness brochure. Columns 4
and 5 give the heteroscedasticity robust standard errors and the p-values, respectively.
The estimates for the brochure developed by our team and the videos about the negative
consequences of bribery and a hostile corporate raid, i.e. reiderstvo, are presented in
columns 6 – 8, 9 – 11, and 12 – 14, respectively.
Looking at the control means, we find that informal practices are judged to be quite
prevalent among the surveyed students. The use of crib sheets during exams, partial
plagiarism from the internet, and copying from other students during exams is thought
to occur rather often, as their control means are close to 4 on a scale from 1 (never)
to 5 (systematically). Also, submitting papers downloaded from the internet, buying
papers, deceiving professors, and asking for preferential treatment are considered common
practices with control means around 3. Three treatments – the two brochures and the
11We set the minimum subgroup size to 200 observations (with a minimum of 100 treated and 100
non-treated), which is in our case sufficiently small to filter out the most important effect heterogeneities,
while all other parameters of the procedure are set to their default values.
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Table 2: Effects in the total sample
Outcome Control Official brochure Tailored brochure Video: bribery Video: reiderstvo
mean Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v.
How often do you think students use the following practices? (1=never... 5=systematically)
Use crib sheets at exams 3.93 -0.02 0.06 0.77 -0.02 0.06 0.70 0.01 0.06 0.87 -0.02 0.07 0.75
Submit papers downloaded from the internet 3.49 0.02 0.07 0.81 -0.01 0.07 0.93 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.96
Buy papers 3.21 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.36 0.08 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.08 0.33
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet 3.75 0.09 0.07 0.17 0.18 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.07 0.20 0.08 0.07 0.23
Copy from other students during exams or tests 3.74 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.42
Deceive professors about study problems 3.10 -0.04 0.08 0.62 0.06 0.08 0.47 -0.01 0.08 0.92 0.06 0.08 0.45
Ask professors preferential treatment 2.47 -0.04 0.08 0.57 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.39 0.04 0.08 0.61
When do you think these practices are acceptable? (1=definitely no... 5=definitely yes)
When a course is useless 2.63 0.27 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.72 -0.01 0.09 0.89 0.03 0.09 0.75
When students work 2.98 0.16 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.90 0.03 0.09 0.76 -0.08 0.09 0.37
If it is hard to learn material 2.71 0.17 0.08 0.04 -0.01 0.08 0.88 0.04 0.08 0.61 -0.09 0.09 0.31
Always acceptable 2.11 0.09 0.07 0.24 -0.02 0.07 0.80 0.09 0.08 0.23 0.00 0.08 0.99
Never acceptable 3.00 -0.13 0.09 0.16 -0.16 0.09 0.07 -0.09 0.09 0.33 -0.01 0.10 0.92
What does corruption mean to you? (1= definitely no... 5= definitely yes)
Necessity 1.92 0.10 0.07 0.19 0.03 0.07 0.69 0.04 0.08 0.59 0.03 0.08 0.72
Means of income 2.85 0.19 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.61 0.13 0.09 0.15 -0.06 0.10 0.50
Crime 4.08 -0.02 0.08 0.84 -0.06 0.07 0.38 0.06 0.08 0.45 -0.01 0.08 0.90
Means to solve problems 3.07 0.08 0.08 0.32 0.05 0.08 0.53 -0.02 0.09 0.82 -0.09 0.09 0.31
Compensation for low salaries 2.59 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.28 -0.01 0.09 0.90 -0.03 0.09 0.77
Evil 3.83 0.00 0.08 0.99 0.01 0.08 0.93 -0.01 0.09 0.91 -0.11 0.10 0.25
In your view, how does corruption affect...? (1=strictly negative... 5=fully positive)
Your career opportunities 2.34 0.03 0.07 0.68 -0.05 0.07 0.47 -0.06 0.08 0.44 0.01 0.08 0.92
Your quality of life 2.39 0.03 0.07 0.68 -0.07 0.07 0.29 -0.04 0.07 0.56 -0.01 0.08 0.90
Your education 2.22 -0.01 0.07 0.94 -0.02 0.07 0.78 -0.09 0.07 0.20 -0.03 0.08 0.68
Your health 2.28 0.02 0.07 0.78 -0.05 0.07 0.46 -0.02 0.07 0.83 -0.10 0.07 0.19
Your safety 2.09 -0.04 0.07 0.53 -0.03 0.07 0.63 -0.09 0.07 0.18 -0.09 0.07 0.20
Russian economy 1.52 0.06 0.05 0.30 -0.01 0.05 0.86 0.01 0.05 0.84 0.07 0.06 0.27
Russian politics 1.58 0.03 0.06 0.56 -0.01 0.05 0.82 -0.01 0.05 0.80 0.03 0.06 0.65
Russian education 1.55 0.08 0.05 0.14 0.02 0.05 0.74 -0.01 0.05 0.82 0.04 0.06 0.50
Russian health system 1.54 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.84 0.03 0.06 0.61 0.05 0.06 0.42
Russian police 1.44 0.10 0.06 0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.82 0.01 0.06 0.83 0.06 0.06 0.28
Can corruption be eradicated in Russia? 2.52 -0.06 0.07 0.38 -0.10 0.07 0.13 -0.12 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.08 1.00
(1=definitely no... 5=definitely yes)
Take part in roundtable? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.15 -0.02 0.01 0.21 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.86
Take part in survey next year? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.12 -0.04 0.02 0.08 -0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.04 0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.02 0.29
Notes: ‘Effect’ represents the difference between the mean outcome value in each treatment group and the control mean, ‘se’ provides asymptotic standard
error robust to heteroscedasticity, and ‘p-v.’ stands for p-value.
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anti-bribery video – have statistically significantly (up to the 10% level) influenced some
of these perceptions and other outcomes.
The perceived frequencies of submitting papers downloaded from the internet, partial
plagiarism, and copying from others during exams are increased, respectively, by the
anti-bribery video (significant at the 10% level), the tailored brochure (significant at the
1% level), and the official brochure (significant at the 10% level). Furthermore, the official
brochure augments the acceptance of informal practices in situations when a course is
seen as useless (significant at the 1% level), when students work outside of the university
(significant at the 10% level), and when the course material is difficult to learn (significant
at the 5% level). The tailored brochure significantly (at the 10% level) reduces disapproval
of informal practices.
What stands out when inspecting the moral assessment of corruption is that “crime”
and “evil” are the strongest associations with corruption, whereas defining corruption as
a necessity is the least popular option. The only treatment to statistically significantly (at
the 5% level) affect these outcomes is the official brochure, which increases the tendency
to link corruption to a means of income. Interestingly, students perceive corruption’s
impact on an aggregate level (i.e. its effects on the Russian economy, politics, education
and health systems, and police) more negatively, on average, than on a personal level
(i.e. on “your” career opportunities, quality of life, education, health, and safety). The
official brochure leads to a more positive perception of corruption effects on the Russian
health system and police (significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively), but no
other statically significant treatment effects are found for this group of the outcomes.
The students’ opinion on whether corruption can be eradicated in Russia lies somewhat
more on the negative side and is not significantly affected by our intervention.
As far as participation in future corruption-awareness activities is concerned, the
students expressed very little interest: only 5% agreed to join a roundtable discussion
about corruption, and 12% were willing to take part in a next-year survey about
corruption. The intervention seems to lower these figures even further, although few
effects are statistically significant. The intention to participate in a subsequent survey
declines by 4 percentage points under the official brochure and the anti-bribery video
(both significant at the 10% level), while the latter video also slightly lowers interest in
the roundtable (significant at the 5% level).
As a robustness check, we apply the post-double-selection method by Belloni et al.
(2014) to control for the covariates and their transformations when estimating treatment
effects. The results are presented in Table A2 in Appendix A. The effects are very similar
in terms of size and significance to the mean difference estimates presented here. Minor
differences are that the impacts of the official brochure on the perceived frequency of
13
copying from other students during exams and on the implications of corruption for the
Russian health system are not statistically significant at conventional levels.
4.2 Heterogeneity of effects
Applying the recursive partitioning algorithm of Athey and Imbens (2016) to our data
indicates that the treatment effects for several outcomes differed across the following
subgroups: students who often or systematically write papers plagiarizing some chapters
from the internet versus those who do it never, seldom, or sometimes; participants with
excellent grades versus those who get satisfactory to good grades; individuals whose
fathers obtained higher education or an academic degree versus those whose fathers
obtained only secondary education.
Comparing the 912 students who often or systematically write papers partially
plagiarized from the internet (Table 3) to the 1,034 students who plagiarize never,
seldom, or sometimes (Table 4), it is striking how the former report a higher frequency
of informal practices among students, demonstrate more acceptance of dishonesty, have
a more positive view of the impact of corruption on society and their own lives, and are
more reluctant to participate in future corruption-awareness activities.12 Focusing on
statistically significant treatment effects, we find them to be mostly negative for regular
“plagiarists” and positive for those who use this practice less frequently. In the aftermath
of our intervention, attitudes towards informal practices and corruption converge between
the two subgroups. Another interesting observation is that the video about a hostile
corporate raid left “non-plagiarists” unaffected.13
Concerning the reported occurrence of corrupt academic behaviour, the official
brochure lowers the frequency of deceiving professors (significant at the 5% level) and
asking them for preferential treatment (significant at the 10% level), as reported by
regular “plagiarists”. In contrast, the reported frequency of informal practices increases
significantly (at the 1-10% levels) among the treated “non-plagiarists”, especially those
who read the tailored brochure. The acceptance of informal practices tends to decline
among treated “plagiarists”, whereas it rises among treated “non-plagiarists”. In
particular, the official brochure increases (significant at the 5% level) the acceptance
of academic dishonesty in various situations among students who rarely copy from the
internet.
12Most of the differences in control means between the two subgroups are statically significant at the
5% or 10% levels.
13Except for the intention to participate in the next year’s survey.
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Table 3: Effects among students who often/systematically write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet
Outcome Control Official brochure Tailored brochure Video: bribery Video: reiderstvo
mean Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v.
How often do you think students use the following practices? (1=never... 5=systematically)
Use crib sheets at exams 4.15 -0.08 0.08 0.32 -0.08 0.08 0.31 -0.09 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.08 0.99
Submit papers downloaded from the internet 3.68 -0.04 0.10 0.69 -0.08 0.10 0.44 0.04 0.11 0.69 0.11 0.10 0.28
Buy papers 3.32 0.04 0.11 0.70 -0.06 0.11 0.57 0.01 0.12 0.91 0.08 0.12 0.53
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet 4.12 0.06 0.08 0.48 0.06 0.08 0.45 -0.03 0.09 0.77 0.08 0.09 0.36
Copy from other students during exams or tests 3.92 0.04 0.10 0.68 0.05 0.09 0.61 0.04 0.10 0.67 0.12 0.10 0.22
Deceive professors about study problems 3.33 -0.31 0.11 0.01 -0.18 0.11 0.10 -0.16 0.12 0.16 -0.06 0.12 0.62
Ask professors preferential treatment 2.58 -0.19 0.11 0.08 -0.11 0.11 0.33 0.02 0.12 0.85 -0.06 0.12 0.64
When do you think these practices are acceptable? (1=definitely no... 5=definitely yes)
When useless course 2.88 -0.01 0.13 0.94 -0.07 0.12 0.59 -0.07 0.13 0.59 -0.09 0.13 0.47
When students work 3.14 0.12 0.12 0.30 -0.03 0.12 0.80 0.04 0.13 0.75 -0.13 0.13 0.33
If hard to learn material 2.94 -0.03 0.12 0.79 -0.22 0.12 0.07 -0.11 0.13 0.37 -0.27 0.13 0.03
Always acceptable 2.32 -0.23 0.11 0.04 -0.32 0.11 0.00 -0.06 0.12 0.60 -0.20 0.12 0.08
Never acceptable 2.88 0.03 0.13 0.85 -0.05 0.13 0.67 0.05 0.13 0.72 -0.01 0.14 0.96
What does corruption mean to you? (1= definitely no... 5= definitely yes)
Necessity 2.03 0.06 0.12 0.62 -0.19 0.10 0.07 -0.08 0.12 0.49 -0.08 0.11 0.46
Means of income 3.03 0.11 0.14 0.42 -0.05 0.14 0.70 0.02 0.14 0.91 -0.10 0.14 0.47
Crime 4.11 0.01 0.11 0.93 -0.06 0.10 0.55 0.05 0.12 0.66 -0.03 0.11 0.80
Means to solve problems 3.32 -0.04 0.12 0.73 -0.14 0.12 0.25 -0.22 0.14 0.11 -0.17 0.14 0.20
Compensation for low salaries 2.85 0.08 0.14 0.55 -0.14 0.14 0.30 -0.20 0.14 0.15 -0.26 0.14 0.07
Evil 3.80 0.05 0.13 0.71 0.05 0.12 0.71 0.06 0.13 0.66 -0.21 0.15 0.16
In your view, how does corruption affect...? (1=strictly negative... 5=fully positive)
Your career opportunities 2.56 -0.07 0.11 0.53 -0.30 0.11 0.01 -0.25 0.12 0.04 -0.09 0.12 0.47
Your quality of life 2.53 -0.03 0.11 0.80 -0.23 0.10 0.03 -0.19 0.12 0.10 -0.03 0.12 0.83
Your education 2.37 -0.15 0.11 0.17 -0.20 0.10 0.05 -0.22 0.11 0.04 -0.09 0.12 0.44
Your health 2.36 0.03 0.11 0.77 -0.16 0.11 0.14 -0.08 0.11 0.51 -0.10 0.11 0.35
Your safety 2.13 -0.01 0.11 0.92 -0.11 0.10 0.29 -0.13 0.11 0.23 -0.04 0.11 0.69
Russian economy 1.56 0.06 0.09 0.47 -0.08 0.07 0.31 -0.13 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.56
Russian politics 1.60 0.02 0.09 0.81 -0.05 0.08 0.54 -0.14 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.61
Russian education 1.59 0.00 0.08 0.98 -0.07 0.08 0.34 -0.09 0.08 0.24 0.00 0.09 0.96
Russian health system 1.51 0.09 0.08 0.29 -0.01 0.08 0.86 -0.04 0.08 0.57 0.08 0.09 0.37
Russian police 1.35 0.10 0.08 0.19 0.05 0.08 0.48 0.03 0.08 0.71 0.11 0.08 0.17
Can corruption be eradicated in Russia? 2.38 0.04 0.10 0.69 -0.10 0.10 0.31 -0.05 0.11 0.63 0.04 0.11 0.75
(1=definitely no... 5=definitely yes)
Take part in roundtable? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.90 -0.01 0.02 0.77 -0.02 0.02 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.89
Take part in survey next year? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.09 -0.01 0.03 0.69 -0.01 0.03 0.79 -0.01 0.03 0.80 0.00 0.03 1.00
Notes: ‘Effect’ represents the difference between the mean outcome value in each treatment group and the control mean, ‘se’ provides asymptotic standard
error robust to heteroscedasticity, and ‘p-v.’ stands for p-value.
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Table 4: Effects among students who never/seldom/sometimes write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet
Outcome Control Official brochure Tailored brochure Video: bribery Video: reiderstvo
mean Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v.
How often do you think students use the following practices? (1=never... 5=systematically)
Use crib sheets at exams 3.77 -0.02 0.09 0.86 0.02 0.08 0.83 0.07 0.09 0.44 -0.05 0.10 0.58
Submit papers downloaded from the internet 3.33 0.02 0.11 0.83 0.06 0.10 0.56 0.20 0.10 0.05 -0.05 0.11 0.65
Buy papers 3.11 0.17 0.10 0.11 0.19 0.10 0.06 0.16 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.43
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet 3.45 0.08 0.10 0.41 0.24 0.09 0.01 0.18 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.84
Copy from other students during exams or tests 3.59 0.16 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.10 -0.01 0.11 0.94
Deceive professors about study problems 2.91 0.19 0.12 0.11 0.26 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.12 0.31 0.18 0.12 0.11
Ask professors preferential treatment 2.40 0.05 0.11 0.64 0.32 0.11 0.00 0.08 0.11 0.46 0.15 0.11 0.17
When do you think these practices are acceptable? (1=definitely no... 5=definitely yes)
When useless course 2.43 0.49 0.12 0.00 0.09 0.11 0.42 0.03 0.12 0.79 0.08 0.12 0.50
When students work 2.84 0.17 0.11 0.13 0.04 0.11 0.71 0.03 0.11 0.82 -0.05 0.12 0.68
If hard to learn material 2.55 0.31 0.11 0.01 0.12 0.11 0.25 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.07 0.12 0.54
Always acceptable 1.95 0.35 0.10 0.00 0.19 0.09 0.04 0.22 0.10 0.03 0.17 0.11 0.11
Never acceptable 3.11 -0.26 0.12 0.04 -0.21 0.12 0.08 -0.18 0.13 0.16 0.00 0.14 0.99
What does corruption mean to you? (1= definitely no... 5= definitely yes)
Necessity 1.83 0.14 0.10 0.17 0.20 0.10 0.04 0.16 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.18
Means of income 2.71 0.23 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.29 0.22 0.12 0.06 -0.06 0.14 0.69
Crime 4.07 -0.03 0.11 0.75 -0.07 0.10 0.51 0.05 0.10 0.67 -0.05 0.11 0.63
Means to solve problems 2.88 0.13 0.11 0.21 0.23 0.11 0.04 0.15 0.11 0.18 -0.05 0.12 0.67
Compensation for low salaries 2.38 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.32 0.11 0.00 0.15 0.11 0.20 0.17 0.12 0.15
Evil 3.90 -0.06 0.11 0.60 -0.09 0.11 0.43 -0.13 0.12 0.28 -0.03 0.12 0.80
In your view, how does corruption affect...? (1=strictly negative... 5=fully positive)
Your career opportunities 2.17 0.10 0.10 0.32 0.16 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.35 0.10 0.10 0.33
Your quality of life 2.28 0.05 0.10 0.61 0.05 0.09 0.56 0.08 0.10 0.43 0.00 0.10 0.98
Your education 2.10 0.11 0.10 0.24 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.01 0.10 0.93 0.03 0.10 0.78
Your health 2.20 0.02 0.10 0.88 0.06 0.10 0.54 0.06 0.10 0.56 -0.07 0.10 0.47
Your safety 2.04 -0.06 0.09 0.51 0.07 0.09 0.47 -0.04 0.09 0.69 -0.11 0.10 0.27
Russian economy 1.47 0.05 0.07 0.42 0.07 0.06 0.27 0.15 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.08 0.16
Russian politics 1.55 0.03 0.07 0.64 0.03 0.07 0.61 0.11 0.07 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.61
Russian education 1.51 0.15 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.28 0.12 0.08 0.11
Russian health system 1.56 0.19 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.41 0.10 0.08 0.21 0.07 0.08 0.43
Russian police 1.52 0.11 0.08 0.17 -0.05 0.07 0.48 0.02 0.08 0.81 0.06 0.09 0.48
Can corruption be eradicated in Russia? 2.62 -0.13 0.10 0.20 -0.10 0.09 0.27 -0.15 0.10 0.14 -0.03 0.10 0.80
(1=definitely no... 5=definitely yes)
Take part in roundtable? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.14 -0.03 0.02 0.16 -0.01 0.02 0.73
Take part in survey next year? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.15 -0.05 0.03 0.06 -0.05 0.03 0.07 -0.07 0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.03 0.06
Notes: ‘Effect’ represents the difference between the mean outcome value in each treatment group and the control mean, ‘se’ provides asymptotic standard
error robust to heteroscedasticity, and ‘p-v.’ stands for p-value.
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Among students who plagiarize rarely, the pragmatic vision of corruption is reinforced
by the treatments. Statements like “Corruption is. . . a necessity”, “a means of income”,
“a means to solve problems”, and “a compensation for low salaries” are positively affected,
particularly by the tailored brochure (the effects are significant at the 5% level), as shown
in Table 4. In the subgroup of those who often plagiarize from the internet, the tailored
brochure decreases the tendency to view corruption as a necessity, while the video about
reiderstvo reduces the view that corruption is a compensation for low salaries (both effects
are statistically significant at the 10% level). Regarding the influence of corruption, the
tailored brochure and the anti-bribery video lead to a more negative perception of the
impact of corruption on personal career opportunities, quality of life, education, and
Russian politics among “plagiarists” (the effects on an individual’s life are significant the
5% level; the effect on Russian politics is significant at the 10% level). In the subgroup of
“non-plagiarists”, the tailored brochure, the official brochure, and the video about bribery
have positive effects on the perceived impact of corruption on, respectively: personal
career opportunities (significant at the 10% level), the Russian education and health
systems (significant at the 5% level), and the economy (significant at the 5% level).
When it comes to the interest in participating in future corruption-awareness
activities, only the students who are less prone to plagiarizing from the internet are
significantly affected by the treatments: the probability of taking part in the next
year’s survey drops significantly (at up to the 10% level) by 5-7 percentage points. The
official brochure also reduces (significant at the 10% level) the interest in the roundtable
discussion by 3 percentage points in this subgroup.
We next examine the treatment effects among students with differing academic
performance. The total sample is split into 996 individuals with excellent average
grades (Table 5) and 997 students who usually get satisfactory to good grades
(Table 6). Although both subgroups show similar attitudes towards informal practices
and corruption, our intervention affects the two types of students differently. Excellent
academic performers appear overall to be somewhat more sensitive to the provided
information.
The treatments increase significantly (at the 5% level) the reported frequency of
corrupt practices used to prepare papers among excellent students. In this subgroup, the
official brochure enhances the acceptance of dishonest academic behaviour when a course
is seen as useless, while the video about a hostile corporate raid reduces the acceptance
of informal practices when it is hard to learn the material (both effects are significant
at the 10% level). Among students with satisfactory or good grades, the acceptance of
informal practices is strengthened by the official brochure when a course is seen as useless
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Table 5: Effects among students with excellent grades (4-5; 5)
Outcome Control Official brochure Tailored brochure Video: bribery Video: reiderstvo
mean Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v.
How often do you think students use the following practices? (1=never... 5=systematically)
Use crib sheets at exams 3.93 0.08 0.09 0.38 -0.01 0.09 0.94 0.04 0.09 0.68 0.06 0.09 0.50
Submit papers downloaded from the internet 3.41 0.09 0.10 0.37 0.06 0.10 0.52 0.24 0.10 0.02 0.12 0.11 0.27
Buy papers 3.12 0.28 0.10 0.01 0.12 0.10 0.24 0.18 0.11 0.10 0.23 0.11 0.03
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet 3.69 0.21 0.09 0.02 0.24 0.09 0.01 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.20 0.10 0.04
Copy from other students during exams or tests 3.77 0.12 0.10 0.21 0.03 0.09 0.72 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.10 0.14
Deceive professors about study problems 3.12 -0.01 0.11 0.94 0.04 0.12 0.72 0.02 0.12 0.84 0.00 0.12 0.98
Ask professors preferential treatment 2.43 0.01 0.11 0.90 0.04 0.11 0.71 0.12 0.11 0.28 0.09 0.11 0.41
When do you think these practices are acceptable? (1=definitely no... 5=definitely yes)
When useless course 2.57 0.23 0.13 0.07 -0.05 0.12 0.68 -0.01 0.12 0.96 -0.04 0.13 0.76
When students work 2.88 0.19 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.50 0.01 0.12 0.96 -0.18 0.12 0.14
If hard to learn material 2.59 0.14 0.11 0.22 -0.04 0.11 0.75 0.04 0.12 0.74 -0.21 0.12 0.07
Always acceptable 1.97 0.12 0.10 0.25 -0.04 0.10 0.68 0.13 0.10 0.20 0.04 0.11 0.70
Never acceptable 3.00 -0.08 0.13 0.55 -0.14 0.13 0.28 -0.09 0.13 0.50 -0.02 0.14 0.87
What does corruption mean to you? (1= definitely no... 5= definitely yes)
Necessity 1.82 0.08 0.10 0.44 0.06 0.10 0.54 0.13 0.11 0.20 0.03 0.10 0.78
Means of income 2.74 0.30 0.13 0.02 -0.02 0.13 0.85 0.17 0.13 0.21 0.13 0.14 0.35
Crime 4.16 0.03 0.10 0.81 -0.05 0.10 0.60 0.07 0.10 0.49 0.05 0.10 0.63
Means to solve problems 3.05 0.05 0.11 0.66 -0.07 0.12 0.57 -0.15 0.12 0.21 -0.21 0.13 0.10
Compensation for low salaries 2.58 0.12 0.13 0.37 0.13 0.13 0.32 0.06 0.12 0.63 -0.13 0.13 0.33
Evil 3.99 -0.03 0.11 0.77 -0.05 0.11 0.67 -0.06 0.12 0.62 -0.20 0.14 0.13
In your view, how does corruption affect...? (1=strictly negative... 5=fully positive)
Your career opportunities 2.33 0.00 0.11 0.97 -0.13 0.10 0.18 -0.09 0.11 0.41 -0.08 0.11 0.48
Your quality of life 2.39 -0.02 0.11 0.85 -0.21 0.10 0.03 -0.14 0.11 0.19 -0.10 0.10 0.33
Your education 2.18 -0.08 0.10 0.38 -0.19 0.09 0.04 -0.09 0.10 0.38 -0.10 0.10 0.33
Your health 2.30 -0.10 0.10 0.33 -0.17 0.10 0.08 -0.02 0.11 0.82 -0.30 0.10 0.00
Your safety 2.11 -0.15 0.10 0.13 -0.18 0.10 0.06 -0.15 0.10 0.15 -0.16 0.10 0.11
Russian economy 1.53 0.05 0.08 0.54 -0.14 0.07 0.04 -0.02 0.08 0.84 -0.08 0.08 0.28
Russian politics 1.55 0.07 0.08 0.38 -0.06 0.07 0.43 -0.03 0.08 0.67 -0.09 0.08 0.25
Russian education 1.56 0.04 0.07 0.64 -0.10 0.07 0.17 -0.06 0.07 0.38 -0.09 0.08 0.25
Russian health system 1.51 0.13 0.08 0.13 -0.03 0.07 0.66 0.02 0.08 0.80 -0.02 0.08 0.77
Russian police 1.46 0.05 0.08 0.51 -0.09 0.07 0.20 -0.03 0.08 0.75 -0.06 0.08 0.50
Can corruption be eradicated in Russia? 2.58 -0.08 0.10 0.43 -0.09 0.10 0.36 -0.15 0.10 0.15 0.06 0.11 0.57
(1=definitely no... 5=definitely yes)
Take part in roundtable? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.88 0.01 0.02 0.67 -0.01 0.02 0.72 0.04 0.02 0.11
Take part in survey next year? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.13 -0.01 0.03 0.71 -0.02 0.03 0.48 -0.07 0.03 0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.06
Notes: ‘Effect’ represents the difference between the mean outcome value in each treatment group and the control mean, ‘se’ provides asymptotic standard
error robust to heteroscedasticity, and ‘p-v.’ stands for p-value.
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Table 6: Effects among students with satisfactory to good grades (3; 3-4; 4)
Outcome Control Official brochure Tailored brochure Video: bribery Video: reiderstvo
mean Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v.
How often do you think students use the following practices? (1=never... 5=systematically)
Use crib sheets at exams 3.93 -0.11 0.09 0.21 -0.03 0.08 0.74 0.00 0.09 1.00 -0.09 0.10 0.33
Submit papers downloaded from the internet 3.56 -0.05 0.10 0.64 -0.07 0.10 0.49 0.03 0.11 0.81 -0.11 0.11 0.34
Buy papers 3.27 -0.05 0.10 0.67 0.03 0.10 0.77 0.00 0.11 0.99 -0.07 0.12 0.55
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet 3.82 -0.04 0.10 0.72 0.12 0.09 0.19 0.01 0.10 0.92 -0.03 0.10 0.74
Copy from other students during exams or tests 3.71 0.12 0.09 0.21 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.40 -0.04 0.11 0.74
Deceive professors about study problems 3.08 -0.07 0.12 0.56 0.08 0.11 0.46 -0.03 0.12 0.79 0.12 0.12 0.29
Ask professors preferential treatment 2.52 -0.10 0.11 0.36 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.86 -0.01 0.11 0.93
When do you think these practices are acceptable? (1=definitely no... 5=definitely yes)
When useless course 2.68 0.32 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.11 0.34 0.00 0.12 0.97 0.10 0.12 0.42
When students work 3.07 0.13 0.11 0.24 -0.05 0.11 0.65 0.02 0.12 0.85 0.04 0.12 0.77
If hard to learn material 2.83 0.22 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.91 0.04 0.11 0.75 0.05 0.12 0.70
Always acceptable 2.23 0.08 0.11 0.47 0.01 0.10 0.95 0.06 0.11 0.60 -0.04 0.11 0.74
Never acceptable 2.99 -0.17 0.12 0.16 -0.17 0.12 0.15 -0.06 0.13 0.62 0.01 0.13 0.96
What does corruption mean to you? (1= definitely no... 5= definitely yes)
Necessity 2.02 0.13 0.11 0.23 0.00 0.10 0.98 -0.02 0.11 0.83 0.04 0.11 0.73
Means of income 2.96 0.09 0.12 0.46 0.10 0.12 0.43 0.06 0.13 0.62 -0.25 0.13 0.05
Crime 4.00 -0.06 0.11 0.56 -0.07 0.10 0.50 0.01 0.11 0.91 -0.08 0.11 0.47
Means to solve problems 3.10 0.11 0.11 0.33 0.15 0.11 0.18 0.11 0.13 0.38 0.01 0.13 0.93
Compensation for low salaries 2.61 0.14 0.12 0.25 0.05 0.12 0.67 -0.07 0.13 0.60 0.07 0.13 0.58
Evil 3.69 0.01 0.12 0.95 0.05 0.12 0.65 0.00 0.13 1.00 -0.04 0.13 0.76
In your view, how does corruption affect...? (1=strictly negative... 5=fully positive)
Your career opportunities 2.33 0.06 0.10 0.53 0.03 0.10 0.77 -0.02 0.10 0.82 0.09 0.11 0.40
Your quality of life 2.38 0.09 0.10 0.36 0.06 0.10 0.51 0.06 0.10 0.55 0.09 0.11 0.44
Your education 2.27 0.09 0.10 0.38 0.14 0.10 0.15 -0.07 0.10 0.44 0.04 0.11 0.70
Your health 2.24 0.16 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.45 0.01 0.11 0.91 0.12 0.11 0.28
Your safety 2.07 0.06 0.10 0.53 0.10 0.10 0.29 -0.04 0.09 0.69 -0.02 0.10 0.83
Russian economy 1.51 0.06 0.07 0.40 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.62 0.21 0.09 0.02
Russian politics 1.61 -0.01 0.08 0.87 0.02 0.07 0.76 0.02 0.08 0.84 0.13 0.09 0.13
Russian education 1.55 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.63 0.15 0.08 0.06
Russian health system 1.57 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.04 0.07 0.57 0.05 0.08 0.56 0.10 0.08 0.22
Russian police 1.43 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.37 0.04 0.08 0.62 0.18 0.08 0.04
Can corruption be eradicated in Russia? 2.46 -0.05 0.10 0.64 -0.11 0.10 0.24 -0.08 0.11 0.43 -0.06 0.10 0.58
(1=definitely no... 5=definitely yes)
Take part in roundtable? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.08 -0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.02
Take part in survey next year? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.13 -0.01 0.03 0.71 -0.02 0.03 0.48 -0.07 0.03 0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.06
Notes: ‘Effect’ represents the difference between the mean outcome value in each treatment group and the control mean, ‘se’ provides asymptotic standard
error robust to heteroscedasticity, and ‘p-v.’ stands for p-value.
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(significant at the 5% level) and when it is hard to learn the material (significant at the
10% level).
Concerning the moral assessment of corruption, the tendency to consider corruption as
a means of income is amplified (significant at the 5% level) by the official brochure among
excellent academic performers, whereas it is reduced (significant at the 10% level) by the
reiderstvo video in the subgroup of students with satisfactory or good grades. Turning to
the perceived impact of corruption, the treatments affect the opinions of excellent students
mostly negatively. However, only the tailored brochure has systematically significant (at
up to the 10% level) negative effects on the perceived impacts of corruption on personal
quality of life, education, health, safety, as well as on the Russian economy in the top
academic performers subgroup. Additionally, the video about a hostile corporate raid
leads to a more negative perception of corruption for personal health in this subgroup
(the effect is significant at the 1% level). In contrast, opinions about aggregate effects
of corruption among students with satisfactory to good grades are mostly positively
affected by the intervention. The reiderstvo video amplifies the positive perceptions of
the influence of corruption on the Russian economy (significant at the 5% level), education
system (significant at the 10% level), and police (significant at the 5% level), whereas the
official brochure strengthens the positive view of corruption effect only on the Russian
police (significant at the 10% level).
The interest in the future roundtable discussion about corruption is diminished
significantly (at up to the 10% level) by about 4 percentage points by all the treatments
among students with satisfactory to good grades. The video treatments have the same
effects on the likelihood of participating in the future survey for both subgroups of
participants, reducing it by 5-7 percentage points (significant at up to the 10% level).
Finally, the total sample is split by fathers’ highest educational attainment into 934
students whose fathers obtained higher education or an academic degree (Table 7) and 670
whose fathers received only secondary education (Table 8). When comparing the mean
outcomes of the non-treated between both subgroups, the students with more educated
fathers appear to be more tolerant to dishonest academic behaviour and corruption and
more reluctant to participate in future corruption-awareness activities.
Focusing on the treatment effects, the intervention seems work in an unexpected
direction among students with less educated fathers: the official brochure increases
significantly (at up to the 10% level) the acceptance of corrupt academic behaviour in
various situations listed in the questionnaire, while the anti-bribery video also enhances
acceptance when the course material is hard to learn (significant at the 5% level), and the
tailored brochure reduces disapproval of informal practices (significant at the 10% level).
Among students with more educated fathers, the tailored brochure leads to reporting a
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Table 7: Effects among students whose fathers attained higher education or an academic title
Outcome Control Official brochure Tailored brochure Video: bribery Video: reiderstvo
mean Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v.
How often do you think students use the following practices? (1=never... 5=systematically)
Use crib sheets at exams 3.93 -0.07 0.09 0.48 -0.05 0.09 0.56 -0.03 0.09 0.73 -0.07 0.10 0.48
Submit papers downloaded from the internet 3.52 -0.06 0.11 0.59 -0.07 0.10 0.51 0.05 0.11 0.68 0.00 0.11 1.00
Buy papers 3.23 0.00 0.11 0.99 0.03 0.11 0.76 0.05 0.11 0.69 0.10 0.12 0.41
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet 3.74 0.05 0.10 0.65 0.20 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.38 0.14 0.11 0.19
Copy from other students during exams or tests 3.78 0.03 0.10 0.73 0.03 0.09 0.78 0.06 0.10 0.57 0.06 0.11 0.61
Deceive professors about study problems 3.11 -0.11 0.12 0.36 -0.06 0.12 0.62 -0.05 0.12 0.68 0.10 0.12 0.43
Ask professors preferential treatment 2.52 -0.08 0.11 0.50 0.01 0.12 0.96 0.10 0.12 0.37 0.08 0.12 0.52
When do you think these practices are acceptable? (1=definitely no... 5=definitely yes)
When useless course 2.68 0.23 0.13 0.07 -0.01 0.12 0.94 0.01 0.13 0.91 -0.05 0.14 0.70
When students work 3.02 0.15 0.12 0.19 -0.03 0.12 0.81 -0.01 0.12 0.96 -0.20 0.12 0.10
If hard to learn material 2.79 0.14 0.12 0.25 0.04 0.12 0.73 -0.02 0.12 0.87 -0.04 0.13 0.73
Always acceptable 2.18 0.07 0.11 0.50 -0.02 0.10 0.83 0.10 0.11 0.35 0.01 0.12 0.94
Never acceptable 3.00 -0.08 0.13 0.53 -0.09 0.12 0.48 -0.11 0.13 0.39 -0.07 0.14 0.64
What does corruption mean to you? (1= definitely no... 5= definitely yes)
Necessity 2.00 0.11 0.11 0.31 -0.07 0.10 0.51 0.03 0.11 0.75 0.03 0.11 0.76
Means of income 2.93 0.21 0.13 0.10 -0.10 0.13 0.42 0.11 0.13 0.40 -0.30 0.14 0.04
Crime 4.05 0.05 0.11 0.63 -0.10 0.11 0.34 0.04 0.11 0.68 -0.10 0.11 0.38
Means to solve problems 3.25 0.01 0.11 0.94 -0.17 0.12 0.15 -0.07 0.12 0.54 -0.20 0.13 0.13
Compensation for low salaries 2.73 0.14 0.13 0.26 0.00 0.13 0.97 -0.10 0.13 0.43 -0.25 0.14 0.07
Evil 3.81 -0.02 0.12 0.88 0.02 0.12 0.86 0.00 0.12 0.99 -0.20 0.14 0.15
In your view, how does corruption affect...? (1=strictly negative... 5=fully positive)
Your career opportunities 2.41 0.00 0.11 0.97 -0.15 0.10 0.16 -0.16 0.11 0.14 0.05 0.12 0.68
Your quality of life 2.47 -0.02 0.11 0.89 -0.16 0.10 0.12 -0.20 0.11 0.05 -0.02 0.12 0.90
Your education 2.38 -0.12 0.11 0.24 -0.26 0.10 0.01 -0.28 0.10 0.01 -0.25 0.12 0.04
Your health 2.37 -0.02 0.11 0.84 -0.21 0.11 0.06 -0.10 0.11 0.36 -0.25 0.11 0.02
Your safety 2.12 -0.04 0.11 0.72 -0.14 0.10 0.19 -0.19 0.10 0.06 -0.10 0.11 0.36
Russian economy 1.63 -0.08 0.08 0.30 -0.08 0.07 0.25 -0.09 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.10 0.41
Russian politics 1.67 -0.03 0.08 0.68 -0.10 0.08 0.22 -0.05 0.08 0.51 0.05 0.10 0.59
Russian education 1.66 -0.01 0.08 0.92 -0.07 0.07 0.34 -0.11 0.08 0.14 0.01 0.09 0.88
Russian health system 1.63 0.12 0.09 0.17 -0.07 0.07 0.31 -0.01 0.08 0.90 0.01 0.09 0.88
Russian police 1.58 -0.03 0.08 0.70 -0.12 0.08 0.12 -0.14 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.71
Can corruption be eradicated in Russia? 2.49 -0.06 0.10 0.55 -0.11 0.10 0.28 -0.14 0.11 0.21 0.04 0.11 0.75
(1=definitely no... 5=definitely yes)
Take part in roundtable? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.80 -0.02 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.54
Take part in survey next year? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.09 -0.02 0.03 0.57 0.00 0.03 0.87 0.00 0.03 0.94 -0.02 0.03 0.53
Notes: ‘Effect’ represents the difference between the mean outcome value in each treatment group and the control mean, ‘se’ provides asymptotic standard
error robust to heteroscedasticity, and ‘p-v.’ stands for p-value.
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Table 8: Effects among students whose fathers attained secondary education
Outcome Control Official brochure Tailored brochure Video: bribery Video: reiderstvo
mean Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v.
How often do you think students use the following practices? (1=never... 5=systematically)
Use crib sheets at exams 3.96 -0.10 0.11 0.38 -0.07 0.10 0.49 0.02 0.11 0.87 0.04 0.11 0.68
Submit papers downloaded from the internet 3.55 -0.04 0.12 0.70 -0.06 0.11 0.57 0.13 0.12 0.27 -0.05 0.13 0.68
Buy papers 3.27 0.03 0.13 0.82 -0.03 0.12 0.82 0.01 0.13 0.93 -0.01 0.13 0.95
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet 3.77 0.08 0.12 0.50 0.11 0.11 0.32 0.07 0.12 0.55 0.06 0.12 0.64
Copy from other students during exams or tests 3.79 0.14 0.11 0.19 0.08 0.11 0.49 0.06 0.12 0.58 0.01 0.12 0.97
Deceive professors about study problems 3.14 -0.16 0.14 0.26 -0.04 0.13 0.77 0.06 0.15 0.67 0.09 0.14 0.54
Ask professors preferential treatment 2.44 -0.08 0.13 0.56 0.12 0.13 0.36 -0.09 0.14 0.54 0.00 0.13 0.98
When do you think these practices are acceptable? (1=definitely no... 5=definitely yes)
When useless course 2.53 0.43 0.16 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.81 -0.02 0.15 0.89 0.07 0.15 0.63
When students work 2.83 0.29 0.15 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.84 0.13 0.15 0.38 0.01 0.16 0.96
If hard to learn material 2.56 0.48 0.14 0.00 -0.02 0.14 0.87 0.30 0.14 0.04 -0.14 0.14 0.33
Always acceptable 2.01 0.22 0.13 0.08 0.00 0.12 0.99 0.17 0.13 0.22 -0.02 0.13 0.86
Never acceptable 3.04 -0.20 0.16 0.22 -0.28 0.16 0.07 -0.14 0.16 0.38 0.08 0.16 0.62
What does corruption mean to you? (1= definitely no... 5= definitely yes)
Necessity 1.87 0.07 0.12 0.55 0.04 0.12 0.74 0.05 0.13 0.73 -0.07 0.12 0.59
Means of income 2.63 0.08 0.16 0.61 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.12 0.16 0.44
Crime 4.12 -0.06 0.13 0.65 -0.02 0.12 0.88 0.03 0.14 0.83 0.02 0.13 0.91
Means to solve problems 2.98 0.11 0.14 0.46 0.12 0.15 0.41 -0.06 0.16 0.72 -0.12 0.16 0.43
Compensation for low salaries 2.47 0.18 0.15 0.25 0.02 0.14 0.89 0.00 0.15 0.98 0.07 0.15 0.66
Evil 3.84 -0.01 0.15 0.94 0.07 0.14 0.62 0.04 0.15 0.79 -0.05 0.16 0.77
In your view, how does corruption affect...? (1=strictly negative... 5=fully positive)
Your career opportunities 2.27 0.04 0.13 0.77 0.09 0.12 0.46 0.03 0.14 0.82 -0.11 0.12 0.37
Your quality of life 2.28 0.07 0.13 0.61 -0.08 0.12 0.51 0.15 0.13 0.28 -0.02 0.13 0.88
Your education 2.07 0.10 0.12 0.41 0.21 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.45 0.17 0.13 0.17
Your health 2.14 0.15 0.13 0.27 0.18 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.13 0.48 0.05 0.13 0.69
Your safety 2.00 0.09 0.12 0.48 0.19 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.37 0.04 0.13 0.74
Russian economy 1.36 0.21 0.09 0.02 0.13 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.16 0.18 0.09 0.05
Russian politics 1.46 0.11 0.09 0.21 0.12 0.08 0.11 -0.02 0.08 0.84 0.05 0.09 0.55
Russian education 1.43 0.18 0.09 0.06 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.26 0.13 0.09 0.15
Russian health system 1.42 0.16 0.09 0.09 0.18 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.41 0.23 0.10 0.02
Russian police 1.29 0.32 0.10 0.00 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.22 0.09 0.01
Can corruption be eradicated in Russia? 2.52 0.00 0.12 0.98 -0.13 0.12 0.26 -0.12 0.12 0.32 0.05 0.12 0.66
(1=definitely no... 5=definitely yes)
Take part in roundtable? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.99 -0.02 0.02 0.32 -0.02 0.02 0.44 -0.01 0.03 0.75
Take part in survey next year? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.15 -0.07 0.04 0.05 -0.05 0.04 0.18 -0.06 0.04 0.09 -0.03 0.04 0.42
Notes: ‘Effect’ represents the difference between the mean outcome value in each treatment group and the control mean, ‘se’ provides asymptotic standard
error robust to heteroscedasticity, and ‘p-v.’ stands for p-value.
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higher frequency of partial plagiarism (significant at the 5% level), while the official
brochure increases the acceptance of academic wrongdoing when a course is seen as useless
(significant at the 10% level). The video about reiderstvo weakens the tendency to see
corruption as a means of income (significant at the 5% level) and a compensation for low
salaries among respondents with better-educated fathers (significant at the 10% level).
In this subgroup, the tailored brochure and both videos have some negative effects
on students’ opinions about the influence of corruption on individual quality of life (the
effect of the anti-bribery video is significant at the 10% level), education (the effects are
significant at the 5% level), health (the effect of the tailored brochure is significant at
the 10% level; the effect of the reiderstvo video is significant at the 5% level), safety, and
the Russian health system (effects of the anti-bribery video are significant at the 10%
level for both). On the other hand, the treatments, especially the brochures, increase
the positive perception of corruption on the global level, i.e. the impact of corruption on
the Russian economy (significant at up to the 10% level), education and health systems
(the brochures’ effects are significant at the 10% level), and police (significant at up to
the 10% level) among students with less educated fathers. When looking at the interest
in future corruption-awareness activities, the official brochure and the anti-bribery video
decrease significantly (at the 10% level) the probability of self-expressed participation
in the next year’s survey for the subgroup whose fathers had only secondary education,
while no statistically significant effects are found in the other subgroup.
Tables A3 and A4 in Appendix A present the treatment effects estimated separately
for female and male students, respectively. The investigation of heterogeneities across
gender, although not suggested by the recursive partitioning algorithm, is nevertheless
standard in the literature (see for example Swamy et al., 2001; and Jetter and Walker,
2015). Non-treated females appear to have stronger negative opinions about the
influence of corruption on their lives and to be more reluctant to participate in future
corruption-awareness activities than non-treated males. With fewer significant treatment
effects, female students are, on average, less responsive to the intervention than males.
Lastly, male students are significantly (at the 10% level) dissuaded by the treatments from
participation in corruption-awareness activities, whereas the participation propensity of
females remains unaffected.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the attitudes of Russian students towards dishonest academic
practices and corruption and used an experimental design to investigate the effects of
an educational campaign consisting of four distinct interventions: two brochures (one
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officially provided by the local authorities and one particularly tailored to students)
and two videos (about bribery and hostile corporate takeovers) informing students
about corruption and its negative consequences. The results suggest that various forms
of academic cheating are quite common at Russian universities. At the same time,
the attitudes towards corruption are generally negative among the surveyed students.
Corruption is believed to have particularly detrimental consequences at the aggregate,
i.e. national, level, while its effects at the individual level are viewed somewhat less
negatively.
Even though the effects of the interventions were not too pronounced in the total
sample, we found interesting patterns of impacts, partly going in opposite directions, in
subsamples defined along several dimensions, such as students’ plagiarizing behaviour,
academic performance, fathers’ highest education attainment, and students’ gender. One
interesting result is that the interventions promote awareness of the negative consequences
of corruption among students who plagiarize, while they lead to more tolerance
towards academic dishonesty and more pragmatic attitudes towards corruption among
“non-plagiarists”. Furthermore, excellent students and students with well-educated
fathers predominantly responded to interventions in the desired way by generating more
negative views on corruption, while this is not the case for students with lower academic
performance or less educated fathers. Finally, while female students have a more negative
opinion about corruption than males, they are generally less responsive to interventions.
This demonstrates that information campaigns may affect various groups substantially
differently. While the attitudes and behaviour of some individuals might be slanted in the
desired direction, the very same information can produce detrimental effects by increasing
the awareness of corruption among other groups of individuals. Thus, it appears critical
for policy makers to reflect on population heterogeneity before conducting large-scale
educational campaigns in order to avoid undesired effects.
Comparing the effectiveness across the four interventions, we conclude that the official
brochure was not able to promote negative attitudes towards corruption. In fact, it
increased the acceptance of academic cheating and led to a more positive view of
corruption in the total sample and among students who do not plagiarize and whose
fathers are less educated. The tailored brochure performed better, as it led to stronger
negative perceptions of corruption among excellent students, plagiarists, and students
with more educated fathers. However, it had counterintuitive effects on the perception of
corruption among students with less educated fathers. As for the videos, they were less
effective than the printed materials. The anti-bribery cartoon proved to be more effective
than the video about hostile corporate raiding. Hence, both the content and the form
of information materials appear to matter. When preparing an educational campaign,
24
policy makers should reflect carefully about tailoring the information materials to the
respective target audience in order to maximize effectiveness.
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Appendicies
Appendix A Additional tables
Table A1: F -tests of covariate balance
Covariate variables F -test Prob >F
University 1 1.13 0.34
University 2 0.45 0.77
University 3 0.52 0.72
University 4 1.41 0.23
University 5 0.94 0.44
University 6 1.17 0.32
University 7 1.26 0.28
Major: humanities 0.27 0.90
Major: social sciences 0.53 0.72
Major: technical sciences 0.87 0.48
Major: natural sciences 1.14 0.34
Current academic year: bachelor 0.37 0.83
Current academic year: master 1.03 0.39
Current academic year: diploma 1.40 0.23
Reason for university education: to obtain good education 1.00 0.41
Reason for university education: hard to find job without education 0.32 0.87
Reason for university education: must have degree 1.35 0.25
Reason for university education: wanted to please parents 1.08 0.37
Reason for university education: everyone does that 0.81 0.52
Reason for university education: to delay army service 0.50 0.74
Academic performance (1=satisfactory... 5=excellent) 0.45 0.78
Presents to teachers at school (1=never... 5=systematically) 0.51 0.73
Paying fees at school (1=never... 5=systematically) 0.16 0.96
You/friends encountered any wrongdoing at USE 0.59 0.67
You/friends encountered any wrongdoing at univ.admission 0.90 0.46
Have you heard of your friends solving problems using connections? 0.34 0.85
Have you heard of your solved problems through bribery? 1.15 0.33
Female 0.43 0.79
University education is state financed 1.41 0.23
Place of residence before university: village or town 0.32 0.86
Continued on next page
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Table A1 – continued from previous page
Covariate variables F -test Prob>F
Place of residence before university: city with population 2–250k 0.36 0.84
Place of residence before university: city with population 250–500k 0.44 0.78
Place of residence before university: city with population >500k 1.95 0.10
Age 0.19 0.95
Family status: both parents 2.52 0.04
Family status: only mother 1.59 0.18
Family status: only father 1.95 0.10
Family status: no parents 2.10 0.08
Number of siblings: 0 0.80 0.53
Number of siblings: 1 0.17 0.95
Number of siblings: 2 0.71 0.58
Number of siblings: 3 and more 0.17 0.95
Order of birth 0.75 0.56
Mother’s education: secondary 1.19 0.31
Mother’s education: higher 0.87 0.48
Mother’s education: academic title 0.64 0.64
Father’s education: secondary 0.49 0.74
Father’s education: higher 0.97 0.42
Father’s education: academic title 1.73 0.14
Mother’s occupation: high level manager 1.14 0.34
Mother’s occupation: middle level manager 1.69 0.15
Mother’s occupation: highly qualified specialist 1.36 0.24
Mother’s occupation: clerk 1.79 0.13
Mother’s occupation: worker 0.79 0.53
Mother’s occupation: entrepreneur 1.09 0.36
Mother’s occupation: housewife or retiree 0.72 0.58
Mother’s occupation: unemployed 0.61 0.66
Mother’s occupation: military personnel 1.16 0.33
Father’s occupation: high level manager 1.33 0.26
Father’s occupation: middle level manager 0.91 0.46
Father’s occupation: highly qualified specialist 0.69 0.60
Father’s occupation: clerk 0.16 0.96
Father’s occupation: worker 0.45 0.77
Father’s occupation: entrepreneur 1.68 0.15
Continued on next page
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Table A1 – continued from previous page
Covariate variables F -test Prob>F
Father’s occupation: househusband or retiree 1.99 0.09
Father’s occupation: unemployed 1.24 0.29
Father’s occupation: military personnel 1.18 0.32
Financial situation (1=can only afford food... 5=can afford everything) 1.41 0.23
Monthly expenditures: <10k rub 0.98 0.42
Monthly expenditures: 10 – 20k rub 1.38 0.24
Monthly expenditures: >20k rub 1.27 0.28
Current accommodation: dormitory 0.77 0.55
Current accommodation: living with parents 1.19 0.31
Current accommodation: rent 0.75 0.56
Current accommodation: own an apartment 0.37 0.83
USE points: <150 points 0.25 0.91
USE points: 150 – 200 points 1.26 0.28
USE points: 200 – 250 points 1.62 0.17
USE points: >250 points 2.30 0.06
Student works 1.08 0.36
Employment related to education 2.11 0.08
Encountered bribery at university (1=never... 5=systematically) 0.02 1.00
How often do you use the following practices? (1=never... 5=systematically)
Use crib sheets at exams 1.26 0.28
Submit papers downloaded from the internet 0.83 0.51
Buy papers 1.66 0.16
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet 1.97 0.10
Copy from other students during exams or tests 1.46 0.21
Deceive professors about study problems 1.06 0.38
Ask professors preferential treatment 1.09 0.36
Note: The F -tests test the equality of coefficients across the treatment groups in a regression of each individual
characteristic on treatment indicators with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
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Table A2: Estimates based on OLS with LASSO-selected covariates
Outcome Official brochure Tailored brochure Video: bribery Video: reiderstvo
Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v.
How often do you think students use the following practices? (1=never... 5=systematically)
Use crib sheets at exams -0.04 0.06 0.51 -0.02 0.05 0.71 0.00 0.06 0.97 -0.04 0.06 0.45
Submit papers downloaded from the internet -0.02 0.07 0.76 -0.02 0.06 0.75 0.12 0.07 0.08 -0.01 0.07 0.86
Buy papers 0.08 0.07 0.27 0.06 0.07 0.36 0.06 0.08 0.40 0.08 0.08 0.31
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet 0.06 0.06 0.32 0.15 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.42 0.02 0.07 0.71
Copy from other students during exams or tests 0.09 0.06 0.16 0.08 0.06 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.27 0.04 0.07 0.60
Deceive professors about study problems -0.05 0.08 0.52 0.02 0.07 0.84 -0.03 0.08 0.72 0.05 0.08 0.55
Ask professors preferential treatment -0.02 0.07 0.73 0.08 0.07 0.29 0.06 0.08 0.45 0.04 0.07 0.56
When do you think these practices are acceptable? (1=definitely no... 5=definitely yes)
When useless course 0.19 0.08 0.03 -0.01 0.08 0.94 -0.06 0.08 0.45 -0.01 0.09 0.92
When students work 0.13 0.08 0.09 -0.01 0.08 0.85 0.02 0.08 0.84 -0.09 0.08 0.30
If hard to learn material 0.14 0.08 0.08 -0.03 0.08 0.69 0.01 0.08 0.92 -0.10 0.08 0.24
Always acceptable 0.04 0.07 0.56 -0.07 0.07 0.27 0.04 0.07 0.59 0.00 0.07 0.98
Never acceptable -0.15 0.09 0.11 -0.16 0.09 0.07 -0.10 0.09 0.26 -0.02 0.10 0.82
What does corruption mean to you? (1= definitely no... 5= definitely yes)
Necessity 0.08 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.07 0.98 0.03 0.07 0.72 0.02 0.07 0.77
Means of income 0.18 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.63 0.13 0.09 0.16 -0.08 0.09 0.36
Crime 0.01 0.07 0.94 -0.04 0.07 0.55 0.08 0.07 0.26 -0.01 0.07 0.86
Means to solve problems 0.05 0.08 0.50 0.04 0.08 0.58 -0.04 0.08 0.63 -0.13 0.09 0.14
Compensation for low salaries 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.30 -0.01 0.08 0.91 -0.04 0.09 0.61
Evil 0.00 0.08 0.98 0.01 0.08 0.89 0.00 0.08 0.97 -0.11 0.09 0.25
In your view, how does corruption affect...? (1=strictly negative... 5=fully positive)
Your career opportunities 0.02 0.07 0.74 -0.04 0.07 0.52 -0.07 0.07 0.35 0.00 0.07 0.97
Your quality of life 0.02 0.07 0.76 -0.06 0.07 0.37 -0.04 0.07 0.61 -0.01 0.07 0.89
Your education 0.00 0.07 0.99 -0.03 0.07 0.64 -0.09 0.07 0.21 -0.04 0.07 0.59
Your health 0.03 0.07 0.69 -0.05 0.07 0.49 0.00 0.07 0.99 -0.09 0.07 0.24
Your safety -0.04 0.07 0.57 -0.03 0.07 0.61 -0.09 0.07 0.19 -0.09 0.07 0.22
Russian economy 0.04 0.05 0.48 -0.03 0.05 0.54 0.00 0.05 0.95 0.06 0.06 0.27
Russian politics 0.01 0.05 0.83 -0.03 0.05 0.48 -0.02 0.05 0.66 0.02 0.06 0.72
Russian education 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.00 0.05 0.97 -0.01 0.05 0.88 0.03 0.06 0.56
Russian health system 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.96 0.03 0.06 0.59 0.05 0.06 0.41
Russian police 0.09 0.06 0.10 -0.02 0.05 0.65 0.01 0.05 0.89 0.06 0.06 0.33
Can corruption be eradicated in Russia? -0.03 0.07 0.65 -0.09 0.07 0.20 -0.10 0.07 0.16 0.02 0.07 0.79
(1=definitely no... 5=definitely yes)
Take part in roundtable? (0=no, 1=yes) -0.01 0.01 0.39 -0.01 0.01 0.31 -0.02 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.82
Take part in survey next year?(0=no, 1=yes) -0.03 0.02 0.09 -0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.03 0.02 0.09 -0.02 0.02 0.36
Notes: ‘Effect’ represents the estimate from an OLS regression of an outcome variable on a set of regressors selected in the post-double-selection
LASSO procedure, ‘se’ provides asymptotic standard error, and ‘p-v.’ stands for p-value.
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Table A3: Effects in the female subsample
Outcome Control Official brochure Tailored brochure Video: bribery Video: reiderstvo
mean Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v.
How often do you think students use the following practices? (1=never... 5=systematically)
Use crib sheets at exams 3.99 -0.04 0.08 0.67 -0.07 0.08 0.34 -0.01 0.09 0.92 -0.10 0.08 0.22
Submit papers downloaded from the internet 3.45 0.01 0.10 0.90 0.03 0.09 0.74 0.17 0.10 0.08 -0.01 0.10 0.95
Buy papers 3.14 0.18 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.10 0.17 0.02 0.11 0.85 0.24 0.11 0.02
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet 3.72 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.21 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.54 0.16 0.09 0.09
Copy from other students during exams or tests 3.77 0.07 0.09 0.42 0.06 0.09 0.51 0.08 0.09 0.38 0.05 0.10 0.60
Deceive professors about study problems 3.06 -0.01 0.11 0.95 0.07 0.11 0.53 -0.05 0.11 0.65 0.12 0.11 0.28
Ask professors preferential treatment 2.39 -0.07 0.10 0.51 0.13 0.10 0.22 -0.01 0.11 0.89 0.10 0.11 0.37
When do you think these practices are acceptable? (1= definitely no... 5= definitely yes)
When a course is useless 2.64 0.18 0.12 0.12 -0.08 0.11 0.48 -0.01 0.11 0.95 0.08 0.12 0.52
When students work 2.95 0.09 0.11 0.40 0.03 0.11 0.76 0.09 0.11 0.43 -0.05 0.11 0.65
If it is hard to learn material 2.73 0.16 0.11 0.14 -0.02 0.11 0.84 0.09 0.11 0.41 -0.08 0.11 0.45
Always acceptable 2.04 0.09 0.09 0.34 -0.01 0.09 0.91 0.08 0.10 0.42 0.07 0.10 0.47
Never acceptable 2.92 -0.17 0.12 0.16 -0.12 0.12 0.31 0.02 0.13 0.90 0.04 0.13 0.76
What does corruption mean to you? (1= definitely no... 5= definitely yes)
Necessity 1.87 0.08 0.10 0.40 0.06 0.10 0.54 0.08 0.10 0.43 0.09 0.10 0.35
Means of income 2.78 0.10 0.12 0.42 0.01 0.12 0.92 0.11 0.13 0.36 0.14 0.12 0.28
Crime 4.14 -0.14 0.10 0.17 -0.13 0.10 0.17 0.06 0.10 0.53 -0.05 0.10 0.65
Means to solve problems 2.96 0.09 0.10 0.37 0.13 0.11 0.23 -0.07 0.12 0.53 -0.08 0.12 0.53
Compensation for low salaries 2.52 0.14 0.12 0.25 0.05 0.11 0.64 0.07 0.12 0.59 0.01 0.12 0.91
Evil 3.83 -0.08 0.12 0.53 0.02 0.11 0.87 -0.14 0.12 0.27 -0.02 0.13 0.86
In your view, how does corruption affect...? (1=strictly negative... 5=fully positive)
Your career opportunities 2.30 0.02 0.10 0.85 -0.02 0.09 0.84 -0.02 0.10 0.86 -0.04 0.10 0.68
Your quality of life 2.33 0.06 0.10 0.55 -0.04 0.09 0.69 0.00 0.10 0.96 0.02 0.10 0.89
Your education 2.13 0.05 0.09 0.57 0.03 0.09 0.77 0.03 0.10 0.79 0.01 0.10 0.92
Your health 2.21 0.04 0.10 0.70 0.02 0.09 0.83 0.00 0.10 0.99 -0.09 0.10 0.37
Your safety 1.98 -0.03 0.09 0.74 0.01 0.09 0.90 -0.05 0.09 0.56 -0.05 0.09 0.59
Russian economy 1.51 0.00 0.07 0.95 -0.02 0.06 0.77 -0.02 0.07 0.81 0.05 0.08 0.54
Russian politics 1.58 -0.04 0.07 0.60 -0.03 0.06 0.64 -0.04 0.07 0.54 -0.05 0.08 0.55
Russian education 1.52 0.03 0.07 0.64 0.01 0.06 0.82 0.01 0.07 0.90 0.00 0.07 0.98
Russian health system 1.52 0.04 0.07 0.62 -0.01 0.07 0.94 0.01 0.07 0.90 -0.01 0.07 0.88
Russian police 1.41 0.04 0.07 0.61 -0.01 0.06 0.93 0.01 0.07 0.86 0.00 0.07 0.98
Can corruption be eradicated in Russia? 2.56 -0.12 0.09 0.21 -0.04 0.09 0.67 -0.17 0.10 0.09 -0.10 0.10 0.31
(1=definitely no... 5=definitely yes)
Take part in roundtable? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.86 0.00 0.02 0.96 -0.02 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.02 0.47
Take part in survey next year? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.11 -0.02 0.03 0.40 -0.01 0.03 0.67 -0.02 0.03 0.53 0.00 0.03 0.91
Notes: ‘Effect’ represents the difference between the mean outcome value in each treatment group and the control mean, ‘se’ provides asymptotic standard
error robust to heteroscedasticity, and ‘p-v.’ stands for p-value.
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Table A4: Effects in the male subsample
Outcome Control Official brochure Tailored brochure Video: bribery Video: reiderstvo
mean Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v. Effect se p-v.
How often do you think students use the following practices? (1=never... 5=systematically)
Use crib sheets at exams 3.86 -0.01 0.09 0.94 0.04 0.09 0.67 0.03 0.10 0.77 0.08 0.10 0.46
Submit papers downloaded from the internet 3.54 0.03 0.10 0.77 -0.05 0.10 0.63 0.07 0.11 0.52 0.03 0.12 0.80
Buy papers 3.29 0.03 0.11 0.82 -0.02 0.11 0.87 0.15 0.11 0.16 -0.12 0.12 0.35
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet 3.80 0.04 0.10 0.73 0.14 0.10 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.23 -0.01 0.11 0.94
Copy from other students during exams or tests 3.71 0.18 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.20 0.13 0.10 0.20 0.05 0.12 0.66
Deceive professors about study problems 3.15 -0.07 0.12 0.55 0.05 0.12 0.68 0.05 0.12 0.71 0.00 0.12 0.98
Ask professors preferential treatment 2.58 -0.01 0.11 0.96 0.10 0.12 0.40 0.16 0.12 0.18 -0.02 0.11 0.85
When do you think these practices are acceptable? (1= definitely no... 5= definitely yes)
When a course is useless 2.61 0.39 0.13 0.00 0.15 0.12 0.22 -0.02 0.13 0.88 -0.05 0.14 0.70
When students work 3.01 0.24 0.12 0.04 -0.02 0.12 0.88 -0.06 0.13 0.64 -0.13 0.14 0.35
If hard to learn material 2.69 0.18 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.11 1.00 -0.01 0.12 0.93 -0.11 0.13 0.41
Always acceptable 2.19 0.10 0.12 0.42 -0.03 0.11 0.76 0.10 0.11 0.39 -0.08 0.12 0.50
Never acceptable 3.10 -0.07 0.13 0.60 -0.20 0.13 0.11 -0.21 0.13 0.12 -0.06 0.15 0.68
What does corruption mean to you? (1= definitely no... 5= definitely yes)
Necessity 1.99 0.12 0.11 0.28 -0.02 0.10 0.89 -0.01 0.11 0.96 -0.07 0.12 0.54
Means of income 2.93 0.32 0.14 0.02 0.08 0.13 0.56 0.14 0.13 0.31 -0.32 0.15 0.03
Crime 4.01 0.13 0.11 0.22 0.02 0.11 0.85 0.05 0.12 0.65 0.03 0.11 0.78
Means to solve problems 3.21 0.06 0.12 0.59 -0.05 0.12 0.71 0.02 0.13 0.86 -0.11 0.13 0.39
Compensation for low salaries 2.67 0.14 0.13 0.29 0.13 0.13 0.31 -0.11 0.13 0.41 -0.07 0.14 0.63
Evil 3.83 0.09 0.12 0.43 -0.01 0.12 0.96 0.14 0.12 0.23 -0.23 0.14 0.11
In your view, how does corruption affect...? (1=strictly negative... 5=fully positive)
Your career opportunities 2.37 0.06 0.11 0.58 -0.08 0.10 0.43 -0.10 0.11 0.39 0.10 0.11 0.39
Your quality of life 2.45 -0.01 0.10 0.95 -0.12 0.10 0.26 -0.09 0.11 0.44 -0.03 0.11 0.79
Your education 2.33 -0.06 0.10 0.54 -0.08 0.10 0.46 -0.23 0.10 0.03 -0.06 0.11 0.59
Your health 2.36 0.01 0.11 0.93 -0.14 0.11 0.20 -0.04 0.11 0.76 -0.10 0.11 0.39
Your safety 2.21 -0.04 0.11 0.71 -0.09 0.11 0.43 -0.13 0.11 0.22 -0.14 0.12 0.25
Russian economy 1.52 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.07 0.95 0.05 0.08 0.57 0.10 0.09 0.29
Russian politics 1.56 0.11 0.08 0.18 0.02 0.08 0.85 0.03 0.08 0.73 0.12 0.09 0.18
Russian education 1.59 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.81 -0.03 0.08 0.69 0.10 0.09 0.26
Russian health system 1.56 0.26 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.70 0.06 0.09 0.51 0.13 0.10 0.17
Russian police 1.48 0.18 0.09 0.05 -0.02 0.08 0.82 0.02 0.09 0.87 0.16 0.10 0.12
Can corruption be eradicated in Russia? 2.47 0.01 0.11 0.95 -0.17 0.11 0.11 -0.05 0.11 0.64 0.12 0.12 0.32
(1=definitely no... 5=definitely yes)
Take part in roundtable? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.02 0.32
Take part in survey next year? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.14 -0.05 0.03 0.10 -0.05 0.03 0.06 -0.06 0.03 0.05 -0.05 0.03 0.16
Notes: ‘Effect’ represents the difference between the mean outcome value in each treatment group and the control mean, ‘se’ provides asymptotic standard
error robust to heteroscedasticity, and ‘p-v.’ stands for p-value.
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Appendix B Translation of brochures
“Official” brochure
 
Picture of Vladimir Putin, 
the President of the 
Russian Federation 
“The most effective method of fighting corruption is the development
of civil society and the freedom of mass media. . . The fight against
corruption is the goal of society as a whole. . . ”
V.V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation
Corruption
Corruption is the misuse of official power, any forms of lobbying for the interests of
individuals, companies and organizations to the detriment of the interests of other
individuals, companies, society and the state as a whole. The most common manifestation
of corruption is the receipt or giving of a bribe in one form or another to an official
for a particular action or inaction, resulting in a gain. At the heart of corruption is
the receipt of mutual benefit by corrupt officials to the detriment of the interests of
all other objects and subjects of (usually) an economic process. Corruption includes
the following crimes: abuse of office (articles 285 and 286 of the Criminal Code of the
Russian Federation (CCRF)), giving bribes (article 291, CCRF), accepting bribes (article
290, CCRF), abuse of authority (CCRF), commercial bribery (Article 204, CCRF), as
well as other acts falling under the notion of “corruption”.
Anti-corruption activities are the activities of federal bodies of state power, state
authorities of the Russian Federation, local governments, civil society institutions,
organizations and individuals within their authority aimed at the prevention of
corruption, including the identification and subsequent elimination of the causes of
corruption (prevention of corruption); identifying, preventing, curbing, uncovering and
investigating corrupt practices (combating corruption); minimization and/or elimination
of the consequences of corruption offenses.
When obtaining data on the commission of corruption-related offenses, the
coordination bodies in the field of combating corruption transfer these data to the
appropriate state bodies, who are authorized to verify such data and make decisions
based on the results of the audit in accordance with the procedure established by law.
These are the main directions of the activities of state bodies aimed at improving the
effectiveness of the fight against corruption:
• Implementation of a unified state policy in the field of combating corruption;
• Creation of a mechanism for the interaction of law enforcement and other state
bodies with public and parliamentary commissions on anti-corruption issues, as
well as with citizens and institutions of civil society;
35
• Adoption of legislative, administrative and other measures aimed at forming a
negative attitude towards corrupt behavior in society;
• Introduction of anti-corruption standards, i.e. establishing a unified system of
prohibitions, restrictions and permissions, ensuring the prevention of corruption
in various areas;
• Ensuring the independence of the media;
• Increasing the responsibility of federal bodies of state power, state authorities of the
subjects of the Russian Federation, local governments and their officials for failure
to take measures to eliminate the causes of corruption.
Anti-corruption legislation
• Federal Law of December 25, 2008, # 273-FL “On anti-corruption”
• Presidential decree of April 13, 2010, # 460 “On national anti-corruption strategy”
• Presidential decree of April 11, 2014, # 226 “On national anti-corruption plan for
2014-2015”
In order to create a system of corruption counteraction in the Russian Federation and
to eliminate the causes of corruption, Presidential Decree #815 of May 19, 2008, “On
Measures to Counter Corruption” established the Presidential Council for Countering
Corruption.
Anti-corruption: law, honor, honesty, control
The fight against corruption based solely on the efforts of the authorities is no longer
possible in Russia these days. Substantial changes require clear, explicit support from
the community. We need a sort of army of activists people who occupy an active civil
position on this issue. Only if there is a significant number of such people will change
be possible. Many people see the new wave of corruption fighting as a pre-election PR
action and think that the measures taken are not aimed at achieving the public good,
but rather at obtaining political dividends for individual ruling groups. As a result,
people turn away to do something else: ecology, charity. Already adopted documents are
enough to start a large-scale fight against corruption. There are only a few legal norms
left to be introduced before serious work can be started, for example, criminalizing illicit
enrichment.
Now we need to understand how to make the whole system apply these norms. And
this is already tedious, routine work... and here it is very important that society is not
indifferent to the problem of corruption, the willingness to regularly ask uncomfortable
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questions to the authorities and law enforcement agencies, demand results and bring the
investigation to the end.
Ella Panfilova, member of the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights
Statistics
According to the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM):
• Russians recognize a high (80%) level of corruption in society as a whole, as well as
at the local level;
• The most corrupt spheres are believed to be local authorities (39%), traffic police
(27%), federal authorities (26%), police (excluding traffic police) and medicine (19%
each), judiciary and big business (18% each), public utilities and education (14%
and 13%, respectively), local military administrative agencies and the army in
general (6% and 4%);
• Russians think that the corruption level of federal authorities is increasing;
• Despite high levels of corruption within the traffic police (State Road Safety
Inspectorate) and police in general, a new trend towards a decrease of corruption
activities has been observed;
• One out of every five Russian citizens (19%) gave bribes within the last year;
• Those who gave bribes admit it happens most often when dealing with medical
personnel (54%);
• There was a significant decrease in bribe giving in education (21%).
The survey was conducted October 5-6, 2013. There were 1,600 respondents in 130
localities in 42 Russian regions.
Penalties
Russian criminal law provides for punishment not only for giving bribes for illegal actions,
but also for giving any bribes. Article 291 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
distinguishes four types of bribes, depending on their size:
• Simple – under 25,000 rubles [$374]14;
• Substantial – above 25,000 rubles [$374];
• Large – above 150,000 rubles [$2,244];
14Based on the 2015 yearly average exchange rate from the Russian Central Bank.
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• Especially large – above 1 million rubles [$14,963].
Anti-Corruption Measures
Measures have been taken to reduce the number of corruption offenses and minimize the
consequences of their manifestation in the Khabarovsk region:
• There is the governor’s Anti-Corruption Council, which is a collegial body that
ensures the coordination of the activities of executive authorities, regional and
federal governmental bodies and municipal authorities aimed at implementing state
policy in the field of anti-corruption;
• The regional law “On the Prevention of Corruption in the Khabarovsk region” is
being implemented;
• Measures of the regional program “Prevention of Corruption in the Khabarovsk
region for 2011-2013” were implemented;
• The regional program “Ensuring public security and countering criminality in the
Khabarovsk region” has been approved for 2014-2020, within the framework of
which 26 systemic measures to prevent corruption are envisaged;
• A feedback line has been organized with the population of the Khabarovsk region
by means of a telephone hotline and email for receiving citizens’ communications
on corruption issues in the bodies of state power and administration;
• The procedure for notifying the representative of an employer about attempts to
incite a public civil servant to commit corruption offenses has been approved;
• Commissions on the observance of requirements of service behavior and conflict of
interest settlement have been formed and are currently operating;
• A list of positions has been determined whereby state civil servants of the
Khabarovsk region are required to submit information about their incomes,
property and liabilities of a property nature;
• The procedure for providing information on incomes, expenditures and property
and the procedure for their verification by state civil servants has been defined.
“Despite the formation in the Russian Federation of the legal and organizational
framework for combating corruption, corresponding to the needs of the time, the
prevalence of this phenomenon continues to be high. Numerous facts of corruption
crimes committed against state power, the interests of public service and service in local
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self-government bodies are noted. There are stable tendencies to merge the interests of
business and officials, including officials and business representatives of foreign countries
in corruption schemes.
Being one of the systemic threats to public security, corruption significantly hampers
the normal functioning of state bodies and local self-government bodies, impedes social
reforms and modernization of the Russian economy, causes serious concern in society and
distrust of state institutions, and creates a negative image of Russia in the international
arena.”
From the Concept of public safety in the Russian Federation for the period until 2020
approved by the President of the Russian Federation on November 20, 2013
Letter of the law
Punishment for bribe-takers:
• Fine - 25 to 100 times the size of the bribe
• Imprisonment - up to 15 years
• Additional punishment includes the deprivation of the right to occupy certain
positions or engage in certain activities for up to 3 years
Punishment for bribe-givers:
• Fine - 15 to 90 times the size of the bribe
• Imprisonment - up to 12 years
Punishment for middlemen:
• Fine - 15 to 90 times the size of the bribe
• Imprisonment - up to 12 years and a fine equivalent to 70 bribes
Punishment for commercial bribery:
• Fine - 10 to 70 times the size of the bribe
• Imprisonment - up to 6 years and a fine equivalent to 40 bribes
• Additional punishment includes the deprivation of the right to occupy certain
positions or engage in certain activities for up to 3 years
Punishment for solicitation of a bribe or commercial bribery:
• Fine - up to 200,000 rubles [$2,992]
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• Imprisonment - up to 5 years
A person who has given a bribe is released from criminal liability if it actively contributed
to the disclosure and/or investigation of a crime and after the commission of the crime
voluntarily informed the body entitled to initiate criminal proceedings to give a bribe.
Hotlines of the representatives of the federal authorities in the region
• Administration of the Federal Security Service in the Khabarovsk region:
(4212)79-79-79
• Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the
Khabarovsk region: (4212)38-73-87
• Transport Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation
in the Far East Federal Region: (4212)30-13-71, (4212)56-61-03
• Investigative Department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation
in the Khabarovsk region: (4212)47-03-08
• Far East Investigative Department of Transport of the Investigative Committee of
the Russian Federation: (4212)21-07-21
• Administration of the Federal Migration Service in the Khabarovsk region:
(4212)54-62-62
• Administration of the Federal Bailiffs Service in the Khabarovsk region:
(4212)39-96-90
• Regional Administration of the Federal Drug Control Service in the Khabarovsk
region: (4212)32-55-55, (4212)79-49-49, 8-800-345-67-89
• Administration of the Federal Penitentiary Service in the Khabarovsk region:
(4212)565-888, email: doverie ufsin@mail.ru
• Administration of the State Road Safety Inspectorate of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of the Russian Federation in the Khabarovsk region: (4212)59-59-59
• Administration of the Federal Tax Service of the Russian Federation in the
Khabarovsk region: (4212)45-09-38
• Prosecutor’s office of the Khabarovsk region: (4212)32-41-70, email:
phk@phk.hbr.ru
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• Military prosecutor’s office of the Far Eastern Military District (in Khabarovsk):
(4212)39-54-57
Hotlines of the regional government
• For questions on corruption involving public authorities and government:
(4212)32-75-30, email: anticor@adm.khv.ru
• For questions on the issues of barriers to the development of entrepreneurship by
federal, regional executive bodies, or local self-government bodies: (4212)31-35-31
Anti-Corruption Council of the Governor of the Khabarovsk Region
Press and Mass Communications Committee of the Government of the Khabarovsk Region
Printed by “Khabarovsk regional printing house” (circulation 7,000)
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“Tailored” brochure
Corruption is an abuse of entrusted power by an official, aimed at extracting personal or
collective benefits in monetary and nonmonetary forms.
• Russia was ranked 119 out of 168 countries in the global Corruption Perceptions
Index, sharing its rank with Sierra Leone, Guyana and Azerbaijan.
• 44 billion rubles [$658 million] was the officially estimated damage from corruption
in Russia in 2015. For comparison, the budget expenditures of the Khabarovsk













Bribery is money, objects or services that an official receives in exchange for doing some
action (or for taking no action) in the interests of the one who gives a bribe. Giving and
taking bribes are the most common types of corruption.
• 212 thousand rubles [$3,172] is the average bribe size in Russia.
How does bribery affect society and the state?
• Those who act honestly and do not pay bribes suffer. “Why should I help this
person for free, when I will not get anything in return,” thinks a corrupt official.
• The quality of state services deteriorates. If a policeman gets used to working for
bribes, he loses the motivation to work with conscience. A corrupt doctor refuses
to treat patients without a bribe.
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Price of corruption
Sometimes it may seem that corruption does not affect the lives of ordinary people. This
is not true.
In the village of Mnogovershinny, in the Khabarovsk region, substandard water
poisoned 120 people. Corruption was the reason. “The water intake has been under
construction for four years... Over 60 million rubles [$0.9 million] have already been
spent, which is several times more than the planned amount. However, as a matter of
fact, there is no water intake, and the money is all gone.”*
“Large amounts of money are allocated to the construction of socially significant
facilities. For instance, 1 billion 40 million rubles [$0.6 million] was allocated for the
construction of apartments for orphans in the Tverdokhlebovo neighborhood in the
Khabarovsk suburbs. The apartments have not been built, and a billion rubles is gone.
Criminal cases are being initiated ... ”*
What can you do?
The people themselves must control those whose job it is to catch and judge corrupt
officials. Civil control can take various forms:
• Anti-corruption activities
• Consumer rights protection
You are the most important element in the fight against corruption.
• Will you become a complainant about corruption?
• Will you give a bribe to a road policeman or not?
• Will you abuse your entrusted position?
Your answers to these questions are directly related to the level of corruption in our
country.
This brochure is based on the materials from the “ABCs of anti-corruption” by Transparency
International Russia
* From an interview with the head of the Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee of
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Abstract
This paper examines how anti-corruption educational campaigns aﬀect the attitudes of Russian 
university students towards corruption and academic integrity. About 2,000 survey participants 
were randomly assigned to one of four diﬀerent information materials (brochures or videos) 
about the negative consequences of corruption or to a control group. Using machine learning to 
detect eﬀect heterogeneity, we ﬁnd that various groups of students react to the same information 
diﬀerently. Those who commonly plagiarize, who receive excellent grades, and whose fathers 
are highly educated develop stronger negative attitudes towards corruption in the aftermath of 
our intervention. However, some information materials lead to more tolerant views on corruption 
among those who rarely plagiarize, who receive average or above average grades, and whose 
fathers are less educated. Therefore, policy makers aiming to implement anti-corruption education 
at a larger scale should scrutinize the possibility of (undesired) heterogeneous eﬀects across 
student groups.
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